Pensions

Same private/public ages, adjusted by statutory life-expectancy formula. Before 65 about 7% per year: 86% at 63,93% at 64,100% at 65 of reference pension; contribution duration may still prorate(41/43 example).2027 old rules; old/new gap capped±3%2028,±6%2029,±12%2030, full scheme 2031.€9 bn 2032 gain/future balance are forecasts, not guarantees.

Overlaps another campaign measure; the campaign stresses the benefit for women and interrupted careers. The full rate does not necessarily remove prorating by quarters: it is not a promise of an unconditional full pension.

43 contributed years required; around+14% net pay and neutrality if 10% more older workers stay active are forecasts. Pension uplift/reformed work-pension combination from 65.15 Octsource is newer than 11 Sep 03-04; compare parameters rather than automatically merge.

Without claiming pension/full-time work, permanent uplift; work-pension pay exempt except CSG/CRDS/income tax, pension reduced by 30% of pay then restored on stopping, no six-month wait. Differs from 03-04 which proposed replacing uplift/combination. Financial examples remain campaign illustrations.

Social partners by occupation/sector: part-time, adaptation, retraining and penalty buybacks from 63; transfer long-career envelope. Incapacity/invalidity full rate 62 and disabled workers 55 retained. Example of 62-year-old mason mentions part-time despite 63 commitment threshold; timing unresolved, no inferred early rule.

Simplify products and long-term tax incentives; incentive/profit-sharing/voluntary flows, no diversion of pension contributions or reduction of pay-as-you-go pensions proposed. Joint governance and diversified prudent transparent real-economy investments. Individually owned, voluntary membership; eventual productive-capital target around €1 trillion, no guaranteed return.

A 1% contribution on pay below the social-security ceiling would be split equally between employee and employer; the account would be locked until retirement and given proposed constitutional protection. The campaign estimates a €6bn flow in 2032 and says existing pay-as-you-go contributions would remain unchanged. In the public sector, the supplementary contribution on bonuses would be doubled and paid into the account; its interaction with the 1% needs clarification. Profit-sharing and incentive payments would enter by default. Social partners would oversee tender-selected managers, labelled funds, capped fees and investment in the French economy; withdrawals could be a lump sum or annuity. Assuming a target annual return of at least 4%, the source projects about €27,000 in nominal euros from the 1% contribution alone over a full career, or about €118,000 over forty years with another €1,000 annually from profit-sharing and incentive payments. Its long-term target is for funded pension savings to provide 25–30% of the pension of young people now entering employment. Current retirees are excluded from this measure. These are targets and projections, not guarantees. This conflicts with the older voluntary, no-new-contribution wording in BR-04-17.

Retain PER/Préfon/workplace savings/life insurance and existing assets. Default profit-sharing into account, annuity 25% tax-exempt. No guaranteed return/early access; overlaps 14-06 without removing voluntary nature of additional saving.

Before statutory age, pension/unemployment contribution relief once all quarters are earned. Afterwards, one scheme replaces pension uplift/work-pension combination: only CSG/CRDS, partial pension-pay combination, no six-month waiting period. End 24-hour part-time minimum; long-career/hardship schemes said to remain. Claimed neutrality conditional on 10% more older workers staying active; estimates unverified.